CVE-2022-50179: linux kernel vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath9k: fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb Syzbot reported use-after-free Read in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() [0]. The problem was in incorrect htc_handle->drv_priv initialization. Probable call trace which can trigger use-after-free: ath9k_htc_probe_device() /* htc_handle->drv_priv = priv; */ ath9k_htc_wait_for_target() <--- Failed ieee80211_free_hw() <--- priv pointer is freed ... ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream() RX_STAT_INC() <--- htc_handle->drv_priv access In order to not add fancy protection for drv_priv we can move htc_handle->drv_priv initialization at the end of the ath9k_htc_probe_device() and add helper macro to make all *_STAT_* macros NULL safe, since syzbot has reported related NULL deref in that macros [1]
CVE-2022-50179CVSS 7.8Linux

CVE-2022-50179: linux kernel vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath9k: fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb Syzbot reported use-after-free Read in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() [0]. The problem was in incorrect htc_handle->drv_priv initialization. Probable call trace which can trigger use-after-free: ath9k_htc_probe_device() /* htc_handle->drv_priv = priv; */ ath9k_htc_wait_for_target() <--- Failed ieee80211_free_hw() <--- priv pointer is freed <IRQ> ... ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream() RX_STAT_INC() <--- htc_handle->drv_priv access In order to not add fancy protection for drv_priv we can move htc_handle->drv_priv initialization at the end of the ath9k_htc_probe_device() and add helper macro to make all *_STAT_* macros NULL safe, since syzbot has reported related NULL deref in that macros [1]

CVSS
7.8 HIGH
EPSS
11.06%
Known exploited
not in KEV
Product
linux kernel

What is known

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ath9k: fix use-after-free in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb Syzbot reported use-after-free Read in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() [0]. The problem was in incorrect htc_handle->drv_priv initialization. Probable call trace which can trigger use-after-free: ath9k_htc_probe_device() /* htc_handle->drv_priv = priv; */ ath9k_htc_wait_for_target() <--- Failed ieee80211_free_hw() <--- priv pointer is freed <IRQ> ... ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb() ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream() RX_STAT_INC() <--- htc_handle->drv_priv access In order to not add fancy protection for drv_priv we can move htc_handle->drv_priv initialization at the end of the ath9k_htc_probe_device() and add helper macro to make all *_STAT_* macros NULL safe, since syzbot has reported related NULL deref in that macros [1]

Sources

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