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CVE-2025-68227
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF The sockmap feature allows bpf syscall from userspace, or based on bpf sockops, replacing the sk_prot of sockets during protocol stack processing with sockmap's custom read/write interfaces. ''' tcp_rcv_state_process() syn_recv_sock()/subflow_syn_recv_sock() tcp_init_transfer(BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB) bpf_skops_established <== sockops bpf_sock_map_update(sk) <== call bpf helper tcp_bpf_update_proto() <== update sk_prot ''' When the server has MPTCP enabled but the client sends a TCP SYN without MPTCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() performs a fallback on the subflow, replacing the subflow sk's sk_prot with the native sk_prot. ''' subflow_syn_recv_sock() subflow_ulp_fallback() subflow_drop_ctx() mptcp_subflow_ops_undo_override() ''' Then, this subflow can be normally used by sockmap, which replaces the native sk_prot with sockmap's custom sk_prot. The issue occurs when the user executes accept::mptcp_stream_accept::mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops(). Here, it uses sk->sk_prot to compare with the native sk_prot, but this is incorrect when sockmap is used, as we may incorrectly set sk->sk_socket->ops. This fix uses the more generic sk_family for the comparison instead. Additionally, this also prevents a WARNING from occurring: result from ./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 337 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:68 mptcp_stream_accept \ (net/mptcp/protocol.c:4005) Modules linked in: ... PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> do_accept (net/socket.c:1989) __sys_accept4 (net/socket.c:2028 net/socket.c:2057) __x64_sys_accept (net/socket.c:2067) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f87ac92b83d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
- CVSS
- -
- EPSS
- 7.78%
- Known exploited
- not in KEV
- Product
- -
What is known
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: Fix proto fallback detection with BPF The sockmap feature allows bpf syscall from userspace, or based on bpf sockops, replacing the sk_prot of sockets during protocol stack processing with sockmap's custom read/write interfaces. ''' tcp_rcv_state_process() syn_recv_sock()/subflow_syn_recv_sock() tcp_init_transfer(BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB) bpf_skops_established <== sockops bpf_sock_map_update(sk) <== call bpf helper tcp_bpf_update_proto() <== update sk_prot ''' When the server has MPTCP enabled but the client sends a TCP SYN without MPTCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() performs a fallback on the subflow, replacing the subflow sk's sk_prot with the native sk_prot. ''' subflow_syn_recv_sock() subflow_ulp_fallback() subflow_drop_ctx() mptcp_subflow_ops_undo_override() ''' Then, this subflow can be normally used by sockmap, which replaces the native sk_prot with sockmap's custom sk_prot. The issue occurs when the user executes accept::mptcp_stream_accept::mptcp_fallback_tcp_ops(). Here, it uses sk->sk_prot to compare with the native sk_prot, but this is incorrect when sockmap is used, as we may incorrectly set sk->sk_socket->ops. This fix uses the more generic sk_family for the comparison instead. Additionally, this also prevents a WARNING from occurring: result from ./scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 337 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:68 mptcp_stream_accept \ (net/mptcp/protocol.c:4005) Modules linked in: ... PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> do_accept (net/socket.c:1989) __sys_accept4 (net/socket.c:2028 net/socket.c:2057) __x64_sys_accept (net/socket.c:2067) x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:41) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f87ac92b83d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---