CVE-2024-47740: linux kernel vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.
CVE-2024-47740CVSS 5.5Linux

CVE-2024-47740: linux kernel vulnerability

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.

CVSS
5.5 MEDIUM
EPSS
14.11%
Known exploited
not in KEV
Product
linux kernel

What is known

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.

Sources

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